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Piroozi v. Eighth Jud. Dict. Ct., 131 Nev. Adv. Op. 100 (Dec. 31, 2015)1 
 
TORTS: MEDICAL MALPRACTICE AND COMPARATIVE FAULT 
 
Summary 
 
Real parties in interest, Hurst and Abbington sought and obtained a pretrial order from 
the district court barring petitioners, Dr. Piroozi and Dr. Blahnik, from arguing comparative fault 
of settled defendants at trial and including those defendants’ names on the verdict forms. In 
granting the Writ of Mandamus filed by the petitioners, the Supreme Court of Nevada resolved a 
conflict between NRS 41.141(3)2 and NRS 41A.0453, holding that NRS 41A.0454 preempts NRS 
41.141(3)5 and entitles a defendant to argue the percentage of fault of settled defendants at trial 
and to include the settled defendant’s names on the jury verdict form. 
 
Background 
 
 Hurst and Abbington, jointly and on behalf of their daughter, filed a complaint against 
several medical providers alleging professional negligence. All defendants settled except for the 
petitioners. Prior to trial, Hurst and Abbington filed a motion to bar petitioners from arguing 
comparative fault of the settled defendants at trial and including those defendant’s names on the 
verdict forms. The district court, relying on NRS 41.1416 (the comparative negligence statute 
governing liability of multiple defendants) granted the motion. Petitioners sought a writ of 
mandamus ordering the district court to allow petitioners to argue the comparative fault of the 
settled defendants and to place those names on the verdict forms.  
 
Discussion 
 
Consideration of the writ petition 
 
 The Court considered the writ on the basis that the case involved important legal issues 
that required clarification in order to promote judicial economy and administration.7 The Court 
determined consideration of the petition would promote judicial economy and administration  in 
not only this case, but similar pending negligence cases because the resolution of the issues in 
this case will promote settlements and reduce the time and expense of future trials. 
 
Merits of the writ petition 
 
 Petitioners contended the district court abused its discretion in relying upon NRS 
41.141(3) 8 , which prohibits a jury from considering the comparative negligence of settled 
                                                        
1  By Jessie Folkestad. 
2  NEV. REV. STAT. § 41.141(3). 
3  NEV. REV. STAT. § 41A.045. 
4  Id. 
5  NEV. REV. STAT. § 41.141(3). 
6  NEV. REV. STAT. § 41.141. 
7  Cheung v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Ct., 121 Nev. 867, 869, 124 P.3d 550, 550 (2005). 
8  NEV. REV. STAT. § 41.141(3). 
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defendants and settlement amounts, when a remaining defendant asserts a comparative 
negligence defense. Petitioners argued that NRS 41.141(3) 9  does not apply to professional 
negligence actions against healthcare providers because its application invalidates NRS 
41A.045’s10 abrogation of joint and several liability by preventing petitioners from arguing the 
liability of settled defendants.  
 
 The Court explained the plain language of NRS 41A.04511 unequivocally provides that 
defendants in professional negligence actions are severally liable for damages. Thus, an injured 
plaintiff in a healthcare provider professional negligence action can only recover the defendant’s 
share of the injured plaintiff’s damages. The plain language of NRS 41A.04512 and the statutes 
corresponding ballot initiative explanation demonstrate the purpose of the statute was to protect 
individual defendants from liability exceeding the defendant’s fault.  
 
 In addressing the conflict between the two statutes when read together, the Court held 
that if defendants can be held responsible for only their share of an injured plaintiff’s damages, it 
follows that defendants must be allowed to argue the comparative fault of the settled defendants 
and the jury verdict forms must account for the settled defendant’s percentage of fault. 
Moreover, NRS 41A.04513 is a special statute focusing specifically on professional negligence of 
medical providers. Where a general and a special statute, each relating to the same subject are in 
conflict and cannot be read together, the special statute controls.14 Thus, in this context, NRS 
41A.04515 displaces NRS 41.14116 and the district court was required to permit petitioners the 
opportunity to argue the comparative fault of the settled defendants. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The writ petition was granted because the plain language of NRS 41A.04517 intended that 
defendants in a medical provider negligence action be held responsible only for their share of a 
plaintiff’s damages. Because the case involved medical provider negligence, NRS 41.14118 is 
displaced by NRS 41A.04519 as it is a special statute. It thus follows that defendants must be 
allowed to argue the comparative fault of the settled defendants and the jury verdict forms must 
account for the settled defendant’s percentage of fault. 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
9  Id. 
10  NEV. REV. STAT. § 41A.045 was enacted after Nevada voters approved the Keep Our Doctors in Nevada 
(KODIN) ballot initiative.  
11  Id. 
12  Id. 
13  Id. 
1414  See Laird v. State Pub. Emps. Ret. Bd., 98 Nev. 42, 45, 639 P.2d 1171 (1982). 
15  NEV. REV. STAT. § 41A.045. 
16  NEV. REV. STAT. § 41.141. 
17  NEV. REV. STAT. § 41A.045. 
18  NEV. REV. STAT. § 41.141. 
19  NEV. REV. STAT. § 41A.045. 
3 
 
Dissent 
 
 The dissent concludes that NRS 41A.04520 is ambiguous and does not abrogate NRS 
17.245’s21 offset provision, making it improper to introduce evidence of settlement.22 
 
Ambiguity 
 
 The dissent argued NRS 41A.04523 is ambiguous: 1) The words “each defendant” could 
be read to either limit several liability to actions with multiple defendants or permit several 
liability, even when there is only one defendant; and 2) NRS 41A.04524 is unclear whether the 
percentage of negligence attributable to the defendant for which he/she is liable is based only in 
relation to other defendants in the action or in relation to all persons at fault, including settled 
defendants. In the dissent’s view, because there was ambiguity, legislative history should be 
considered. 
 
Single or multiple defendants 
 
 The dissent considered the ballot explanation section of NRS 41A.04525 to determine 
voter intent. The dissent argued the explanation section of the ballot questionnaire relevant to 
NRS 41A.045 states, “[c]urrent law provides that each one of multiple defendants in medical 
malpractice is severally, but not jointly liable.” Thus, the dissent concluded that the voters 
intended NRS 41A.045 to only apply to medical malpractice actions with multiple defendants.  
 
Several liability in relation to whom 
 
 The dissent contended that requiring multiple defendants for NRS 41A.04526 to apply 
allows the court to resolve the second ambiguity with a canon of statutory interpretation. 
Specifically, when a legislature adopts language that has a particular meaning or history, the 
rules of statutory construction indicate that a court may presume that the legislature intended a 
similar meaning. In applying this canon to the second ambiguity, the dissent contended NRS 
41A.04527 imposes several liability only in relation to remaining defendants, and not settled 
defendants.  
 
 As to the settled defendants, NRS 41A.04528 must be reconciled with NRS 17.245(1)(a)29 
(effects of release or covenant not to sue). The dissent argued that allowing several liability 
                                                        
20  Id. 
21  NEV. REV. STAT. § 17.245. 
22  The majority opinion noted that although the dissent cited NRS 17.245, this statute was not argued in the district 
court, was not discussed in the district court’s order, and was not argued on appeal by the parties. 
23  NEV. REV. STAT. § 41A.045. 
24  Id. 
25  Id. 
26  Id. 
27  Id. 
28  Id. 
29  NEV. REV. STAT. § 17.245(a)(1). 
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between all tortfeasors, including settled defendants, is discordant with NRS 17.245(1)(a),30 
which requires a district court to reduce any judgement by all amounts paid by settled defendants 
that were liable in tort for the same injury. Under this theory, if a defendant could argue 
comparative negligence as to settled defendants, then she would only be liable for her 
proportional fault in relation to them. Because the judgment issued against this defendant would 
amount to her exactly liability, she would receive a windfall when NRS 17.245(1)(a)31 reduced 
that judgment by all settlement amounts. Thus, this interpretation should be avoided because it is 
in conflict with the function of NRS 17.245(1)(a)32. The dissent concluded that NRS 41A.04533 
should be construed to prohibit a defendant from arguing the comparative negligence of settled 
defendants and therefore the district court did not abuse its discretion in its order granting the 
pretrial motion. 
 
NRS 17.245 
 
 The dissent argued the Court has previously held that in association with NRS 
17.245(1)(a)34, parties may not inform the jury as to ether the existence of a settlement or the 
sum paid in order to prevent improper speculation by the jury.35 Thus, the district court did not 
abuse its discretion by not allowing discussion as to a settlement occurring and the settlement 
amount.  
 
Defendant’s names on the jury verdict forms 
 
 The dissent argued the district court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to place 
settled defendant’s names on the jury verdict form because that decision was consistent with the 
Court’s decision in Moore36, wherein the jury may not be informed of settlement. 
                                                        
30  Id. 
31  Id. 
32  Id. 
33  NEV. REV. STAT. § 41A.045. 
34  NEV. REV. STAT. § 17.245(a)(1). 
35  Banks v. Sunrise Hosp., 120 Nev. 822, 843—44, 102 P.3d 52, 67 (2004). 
36  Moore v. Bannen, 106 Nev. 679, 681—682, 799 P.2d 564, 566 (1990). 
